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HOWARD UNIVERSITY 
• 
2900 VAN NESS STREET. N.W. 
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20008 
SCHOOL OF LAW 
Gilmer: No Justioe, No Zn4ustrial Peace1 
By J. Clay smith, Jr. 
Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law 
The question for civil rights claims after Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation, 111 S. ct. 1647 (1991) is: 
whether an employer of fifteen or more people, may, prior to or 
contempo~aneous with employing a person or groups of persons, 
present and exact an agreement to arbitrate all claims, including 
federally created civil rights or constitutional claims, involving 
race, color, sex, creed, religion, or national origin, on any terms 
or conditions of employment? The best answer to this question is 
no. The reason for this answer is that arbitration agreements 
should not render the expressed national purposes against 
employment discrimination and, perhaps, other forms of unlawful 
activity (protected under the post-Reconstruction statutes) as non-
reviewable. 
1 Before the Howard University Symposium on Current Issues in 
Arbitration, Friday, October 8, 1993, sponsored by the Howard 
University School of Law, School of Business, the American 
Arbitration Association, the Baywood Publishing Co., Inc., and the 
National Bar Association. My thanks to Brigette L. stevens, an L3 
student at Howard University School of Law, for her assistance in 
this matter. 
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Before there was a Civil Rights Act of 1964, an employer was 
free to discriminate against persons on the basis of race sex, 
creed, national origin and religion with almost immunity. Some 
states may have adopted fair employment practice laws to protect 
workers against discriminatory acts of their employers. However, 
these laws were not very effective in their enforcement and not 
very strong in the award of remedies. 
The civil Rights Act of" 1964 was the nation's first 
comprehensive employment anti-discrimination law, which, as 
amended, has always faced opposition by some, who believed that 
the resolution of disputes between employer and employee should be 
left for resolution between the two. Because discrimination 
remains a dominant force in the work place, jurisdictional claims 
of discrimination under Title 7 of the civil Rights Act of 1964 
have continued to spiral. Rather than to treat the root causes of 
discrimination, some members of the commercial, and political 
community, have sought to accommodate and advocate for alternative 
means to deal with discrimination outside the courts, where, I 
believe, they predict that employers can save money (attorney's 
fees, filing costs, etc.,) in the defense against such claims, and, 
perhaps, indirectly influence the outcome by the pre/post hiring 
terms set forth in the arbitration agreements. 
Let's examine two hypothetical cases and see how they play in 
a post-Gilmer climate: 
First Case. A, a black woman applies to B, an employer of 100 
people to work in a widget factory~ The factory is located in a 
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small county in Mississippi, where blacks are underemployed and 
historically have been unemployed, and politically unrepresented, 
or marginally so. A is a member of the NAACP, the Mt. Nebo Baptist 
Church, whose minster is a leading civil rights advocate. For 
Black people in the community, jobs are scarce, and black people 
are underemployed, not only in the city of B' s manufacturing 
Company, but in the County as well. Assume further that A has 
three children, is a single parent, rents an apartment, or lives in 
substandard housing and is not well educated. When A applies for 
the job, B informs A that she has the job, but that B wants A to 
sign an agreement that A will arbitrate all claims arising out of 
her employment. What do you think that A is going to do? Let's 
assume the unlikely: that A refuses to signs the agreement, and B 
finds some pretext not to hire A, but never says that the real 
reason that she is not being hired is because A won't sign the 
arbitration agreement? Does anyone believe that the next 
applicant from Mt. Nebo Church, whose circumstances is similar to 
A's is going to decline to sign the arbitration agreement? One can 
assume that when A is presented with the arbitration agreement 
which can be defined as an offer to enter into a legally binding 
contract, A will not have an opportunity to or may not be able to 
afford to consult with a lawyer. My guess is that if A asks to 
take the agreement to a lawyer, that B will not hire A. What 
rights does A have against B? What difference does it make? A is 
a poor black woman, in a community where her value can be 
sUbstituted by someone else. B, the employer, already the dominant 
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person as relates to A, is now further empowered by the Gilmer 
opinion to use liB's right" of conditioning employment on signing 
the arbitration agreement to discriminate without recourse to 
courts of law. 
Second Case. Assume that A, a white female high school 
graduate, works for B, who owns several clothing stores in New York 
city. B has been known to harass women. Indeed, employee 
complaints have been filed, one ,successfully, against him before 
the EEOC. Assume that A is being harassed by B, A will not give in 
and B continues to persist. Assume that A threatens to file a 
complaint against B at EEOC, and in fact does. During the sixty 
days that EEOC has to determine cause, B presents an arbitration 
agreement signed by A that A routinely, but without full knowledge 
of the consequences, signed while being processed through B' s 
personnel office when she was hired four years ago. What does EEOC 
do with this agreement? Assume that A's complaint and EEOC's 
investigation unearths several other victims of B's sexual 
harassment, who, unlike A, do not have the courage to file a claim 
for fear of losing their jobs. How does Gilmer potentially apply 
under these circumstances? Is EEOC precluded from taking a role in 
the claim brought by A? What if EEOC chooses not to exercise its 
enforcement powers? Independent of EEOC, will the federal courts 
grant B's motion to dismiss A's claim when the arbitration 
agreement is presented? will the court hear testimony from A that 
she was unaware that she had signed a preclusion agreement? What 
is the burden of proof to demonstrate lack of knowledge or 
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appreciation of the consequences of signing the agreement 
(particularly of the waiver of constitutional violations or the 
waiver of constitutional rights, e.g., the right to a jury trial). 
will a lawyer even take A's case? 
A. Before attempting to answer the questions posed by these 
two questions let me say that I am not optimistic about the post-
Gilmer era as it relates to the rights of employees. So let me get 
to the point. As rel~tes to employees not members of unions, 
(and, maybe to "individuals," who are members of unions), the 
execution of arbitration agreements will substantially affect their 
rights available under federal and state law. For example, 
employees will be waiving the right to a jury trial by signing an 
arbitration agreement, and other sUbstantive and procedural rights 
available in federal and state courts, such as procedural rights 
available under the Federal Rules of civil Procedure. The question 
is whether employees have reached a point in American labor law 
where Congress or state legislatures must devise a non-waiver 
statement to be provided by a company or employer for hire which 
states something like this: 
"Durinq the course of employment, I (do) / (not) waive any right 
to redress any claim or controversy arising out of my employment in 
a court of law." 
Further, minimally, it seems to me that employers by law 
should be required to advise employees or prospective employees 
that they are not required to sign an arbitration agreement, and 
that if they do not sign one they will not incur any penalty for 
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not doing so. If Congress or state legislatures do not enact such 
protection, I foresee, and encourage the rise of a new industry of 
independent employment counselors to help citizens negotiate jobs 
in non-unionized work places, and more watchdog groups to assure 
that collective bargaining agreements do not unfairly undermine 
federally created rights of employees to have their claims 
determined by the courts. 
B. Legal arguments that may ,counter an extension of Gilmer to 
civil rights type claims are as follows: 
1. Congress could not have intended to include the subject 
matter of civil right-type claims under the FAA in 1925 because 
neither the common law or federal law had experience or practice in 
arbitral disputes with the category of claims arising under Tit. 7. 
2. Congress by its enactment of the FAA/1925 could not have 
legislated in futuro to preclude federal jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of federal or local civil rights claims given the 
history of race in the country in 1925. The resolution of race, 
sex, color, national origin and religious claims arising out of 
employment were not contemplated by Congress in 1925. And, for 
point of argument, assuming that Gilmer stands, and that the FAA 
applies to ADEA claims, it is submitted that such claims do not 
have the same history as race, sex, color, national origin, or 
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religious discriminatory claims in this country to foreclose 
federal courts from hearing the merits of such claims. Gilmer, at 
1652. 
3. Does an individual arbitral contract of employment which 
precludes an action under judicial authority actually constitute a 
transaction affecting commerce? Isn't the discriminatory acts of 
the employer that affects commerce, and doesn't the judicial forum 
made available by Congress under the Ti t. 7 offer, by public 
policy, an overriding, indeed, superior command to have such claims 
resolved in a judicial forum? Gilmer, at 1651, n 2. 
4. If the FAA is intended to liberally favor arbitral 
agreements (Gilmer, at 1651), its reach appears to be limited to 
contracts solely of a commercial nature. Hence, Gilmer may be 
appropriately distinguished by the nature of the unique regulatory 
scheme of the security Exchange Commission (and the anti-trust 
laws, etc.) under which the Gilmer case arose (which is quite 
different from that of workers in an unregulated commercial widget 
factory). Gilmer, at 1652. 
5. The Court in Gilmer states that "Although all statutory 
claims may not be appropriate for arbitration, '[h]avinq made a 
bargain to arbitrate, the parties should be held to it unless 
Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of 
judicial remedies ••• '" Gilmer, at 1652. I submit that the question 
is: Is the "bargain" a fair one? There can be no bargain if the 
condition for it is not legitimate. The very act of the 
arbitration may be an one to limit the reach of federal law on a 
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class basis. Gilmer, at 1652. 
6. The burden of proof assigned in Gilmer would not, in my 
view, be the same if the subject matter of the claim was race, 
color, sex, creed, national origin or religion. The deep rooted 
history of these categories, and there impact on the marketplace as 
demonstrated by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, logically places the 
burden of proof on the employer to demonstrated that Congress's 
intent was to preclude judicial authority to hear Tit. 7 claims as 
a matter of overriding public policy. Gilmer, at 1652. 
7. In Gilmer, themes of efficiency, not justice, dominate, 
and judicially permit, if not encourage, adhesive contracts as 
relates to employment. Even though Gilmer states that "courts 
should remain attuned to well-supported claims that the agreement 
to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming 
economic power that would provide grounds 'for the revocation of 
any contract'" (Gilmer, at 1656), well-supported claims cannot 
logically or reasonably be expected to be established from the 
working poor of America, as against the employers that have the 
power to deny employment to minorities that continue to be 
historically in poverty. See e.g., Paulette Thomas, Poverty Spread 
in 1922 to Total of 36.9 Million, Wall st. J., oct 5, 1993, at A2. 
8. As relate to the regulatory powers of the EEOC, Gilmer 
states: "Finally, it should be remembered that arbitration 
agreements will not preclude the EEOC from b.ringing actions seeking 
classwide and equitable relief." Gilmer, at 1655. This statement 
misreads (or perhaps, properly reads) the history of the EEOC and 
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t~e executive branch of government for the past decade, which so 
underfunded EEOC and other civil rights agencies, so as possibly to 
make the Court's statement in Gilmer meaningless. See e.g., Civil 
Rights Commission to Look at Agencies, Nat'l Law J., Oct. 18, 1993, 
at 5. The resources at EEOC and the unwillingness of presidents 
and Congress to provide adequate funding to enforce civil rights 
claims and policy, or refusal of jurisdictional agencies to enforce 
the law, make the above quote hollow, a statement devoid of 
justice. Arbitration agreements in the labor and civil rights 
areas may encourage federal agencies not to enforce the laws, 
leaving the same for private resolution and out of the reach of the 
courts. 
I predict that when the American people, the poor and the 
middle class discover that even the EEOC is without economic power 
to eradicate discrimination or unable to gain corrective relief in 
the courts because of underfunding, we will see the most dramatic 
demonstrations ever witnessed in this country. I submit that 
politicians (not institutional bodies that have an economic 
interest in arbitration) are going to have to persuade the public 
that arbitration is preferable to Article III adjudication of civil 
rights claims. This is going to pose a serious problem for 
politicians. (The implications of arbitration under state's civil 
rights laws also will be impacted, particularly for million of 
employees not covered by tit. 7, i.e., employees with fewer than 15 
employees.). 
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Given the discourse of this presentation, I leave it to you as 
to whether the problems posed in Case One, and Two above would be 
resolved 'in favor of A. However, I leave you with two of many 
nagging questions to ponder: could Gilmer apply to a 
constitutional protection that is violated by a government employer 
during the c~urse of an employment covered by an arbitration 
agreement, or apply to a federal statutory prohibition or civil 
right of a citizen which is violated by a private employer covered 
by an arbitration agreement? 
10 
